BAKU, Azerbaijan,
March 9. Shipping through the
Strait of Hormuz has effectively stopped. For Kazakhstan’s
transport strategy, this is a serious problem: the country has lost
a potential direct access to the world ocean. Kazakhstan had
planned to use Iran as a “gateway” to enter markets in Southeast
Asia and Africa. Previously, Iran allocated a land plot to
Kazakhstan at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas. The blockade of
the strait puts this project at an impasse.
Kazakhstan and Iran participate in the eastern branch of the
International North–South Transport Corridor, which connects Russia
and Central Asian countries with ports in the Persian Gulf and
India. Kazakhstan has actively invested in developing this corridor
in recent years. In 2024, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and
Turkmenistan signed a roadmap for the synchronized development of
the eastern branch of the route for 2024–2025. The implementation
of measures was expected to increase the corridor’s throughput
capacity to 15 million tons by 2027 and to 20 million tons by
2030.
The war around Iran is also putting pressure on Kazakhstan’s
trade relations with the country. The free trade agreement between
the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran, which came into force on May
15, 2025, provided Iran with preferential access to 90% of the
commodity nomenclature, while tariffs were reduced from 20% to
4.5%. In 2025, trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Iran increased
by 26% to reach $43.2 million, which accounts for only 0.3% of the
country’s total trade. Iran remained an important market for Kazakh
grain: in the 2024/2025 marketing year, exports exceeded 1 million
tons. Overall, however, Iran’s share in Kazakhstan’s trade turnover
is small.
The main problem is that Kazakhstan relied on Iran for direct
access to the ports of the Persian Gulf and the world ocean. If the
situation around the Strait of Hormuz is prolonged, the country
will have to urgently focus on other routes, and full compensation
through new projects will take time.
One alternative is Pakistan. Astana and Islamabad are actively
discussing the possibility of Kazakh cargoes accessing Pakistan’s
seaports – Karachi, Qasim, and Gwadar. These ports are seen not
only as a logistical solution for Kazakhstan but also as potential
transit hubs for all of Central Asia, providing access to markets
in the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Southeast Asia. On May 7, 2025, at
a business forum in Karachi, Kazakhstan and Pakistan signed a
transit trade agreement, giving the country access to the ports of
Karachi and Gwadar. The Ministry of Trade and Integration of
Kazakhstan noted that this document lays the foundation for the
development of new transport and logistics routes and further
strengthening of economic ties between the two countries.
At the same time, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan are
holding consultations on the construction of the
Turgundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin-Buldak railway, which will run from
the western border of Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan
and further toward India. The project plans include the creation of
capacities for transshipment of grain, containers, and other cargo.
The launch of the route is expected to give an additional boost to
cargo turnover, including through the Turgundi hub. The Afghan side
has declared readiness to ensure the transit of goods from
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Pakistan. However, this route also
remains risky due to regional tensions.
Another option is the Middle Corridor through the Caspian Sea,
Azerbaijan, and Türkiye. Increasing flows through the ports of
Aktau and Kuryk could become a priority direction, ensuring the
stability of supplies from Kazakhstan. However, the Iranian route
had its own features, which are not accessible through the Middle
Corridor. It provided direct access to new markets in Southeast
Asia and Africa, for which the North–South route was originally
developed.
Ultimately, Kazakhstan faces a serious logistical challenge.
Alternatives via Pakistan and the Middle Corridor cannot, in the
short term, compensate for the loss of Iran’s “window to the
ocean.” It is now particularly important to actively develop the
Middle Corridor through the Caspian, expand cooperation with
Pakistan, and integrate with Asian and European logistics systems.
This will require time and significant infrastructure investments,
but developing transit corridors will allow Kazakhstan not only to
minimize risks associated with dependence on Iran but also to
strengthen its position in global trade.