BAKU, Azerbaijan, March 6. The recent military
tensions around Iran have disrupted transport routes in the Persian
Gulf and surrounding regions. Hostilities have affected maritime
shipping and vessel insurance coverage, creating uncertainty for
global logistics flows and regional trade.
The conflict has effectively halted the movement of oil tankers
through the strategically important Strait of Hormuz and is
beginning to impact broader supply chains beyond the energy sector.
These disruptions affect not only global supply chains but also the
economies of countries closely connected to Iran through trade and
transit routes, including Turkmenistan. If hostilities continue, a
significant portion of Ashgabat’s foreign trade and economic
activity may need to adjust and hedge against risks.
Economic ties between Turkmenistan and Iran have developed
actively in recent years, with Iran remaining a notable trading
partner for Turkmenistan and an important transit route to southern
markets. In 2023, Iran accounted for 12.5% of Turkmenistan’s total
imports.
In the first ten months of 2025, the total non-oil trade between
the two countries amounted to $555 million and approximately 1.3
million tons of goods. Turkmenistan imports from Iran include
agricultural and food products, industrial goods, electrical
transformers, water treatment systems, and petrochemical products.
Additionally, Iran imports around 2 billion kilowatt-hours of
electricity annually from Turkmenistan.
In recent years, Ashgabat and Tehran have also sought to deepen
cooperation in transport and logistics. In 2025, Iran’s Minister of
Roads and Urban Development, Farzaneh Sadegh, stated that the two
countries aim to increase transit volumes to 20 million tons,
including 6 million tons intended for rail transport. These plans
are linked to broader regional transport initiatives. One of them
is the eastern route of the International North-South Transport
Corridor, which connects Russia and Central Asian countries to
Persian Gulf ports via Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. In 2024,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran agreed on a roadmap for
the synchronized development of this route.
Another project is the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman
multimodal transport corridor, which is intended to connect Central
Asian countries with the Persian Gulf through Iran. In addition,
the China-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway route is being
developed as part of a wider Eurasian transport corridor
network.
Iran also plays a key role in providing Central Asian countries
access to global maritime markets. The ports of Bandar Abbas and
Chabahar serve as critical gateways connecting the region to the
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. If disruptions to transport
flows through Iran persist for an extended period, implementing
such projects may require revising profitability forecasts for
trade operations along these routes.
Alternative routes through Pakistan also face uncertainty. In
early March, tensions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
escalated after a series of airstrikes, complicating the use of
Pakistani ports, including Gwadar, as an alternative outlet for
regional trade.
Under these conditions, Turkmenistan, to compensate for
potential reductions in existing trade volumes due to regional
risks, may seek to strengthen cooperation with partners whose
transport links remain stable. One potential direction is the
development of trade through the Caspian region. Economic and
transit ties with Azerbaijan have been strengthened in recent years
through projects associated with the Middle Corridor, which
connects Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea, the South
Caucasus, and Turkey.
Another key partner remains Türkiye. President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan previously stated that Ankara intends to increase bilateral
trade with Turkmenistan from around $2 billion at the current state
to $5 billion in the coming years.
Georgia is also a potential candidate. In February 2026, during
a visit by the Chairperson of the Turkmenistan Mejlis to Tbilisi, a
cooperation agreement was signed between the parliaments of the two
countries, and discussions also focused on the development of
transport corridors.
In a broader regional context, Turkmenistan may intensify trade
relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in
2026. As part of its chairmanship of the organization, Ashgabat
intends to pay special attention to economic cooperation and
transport connectivity, as previously stated by the country’s
officials.
At the same time, the country continues to expand cooperation
with Europe and Asia. Turkmenistan’s ambassador to Belgium, Sapar
Palvanov, has stated that European engagement is one of the key
priorities of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy in 2026. Meanwhile,
trade between China and Central Asian countries exceeded $100
billion for the first time in 2025, increasing by 12% compared to
the previous year.
Although the duration and scale of the current conflict’s
consequences remain uncertain, disruptions to transport routes
around Iran have already highlighted the vulnerability of regional
supply chains, which heavily rely on specific transit routes. For
Turkmenistan, located at the center of transcontinental transport
networks, these developments could stimulate further
diversification of logistics links and trade partnerships.
Expanding cooperation in the Caspian region, strengthening economic
ties with neighboring countries, and deepening engagement with
European and Asian markets could become important factors in
maintaining stable trade flows during this period of
uncertainty.