BAKU, Azerbaijan, May 5. Azerbaijan’s growing
engagement with the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) should not be seen
as a one-off diplomatic episode, but rather as part of a broader
shift in Europe’s approach to security, energy, and infrastructure
development. Originally focused on cooperation among EU member
states between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic seas, the platform
is gradually expanding beyond its initial scope. Baku’s
participation in a recent 3SI summit signals that the Caspian
region is increasingly being viewed as part of an extended European
strategic space.
Against this backdrop, a new configuration of connectivity is
emerging, stretching from Central Asia through the South Caucasus
to Central and Eastern Europe. What was once considered a
peripheral belt is now gaining importance as a key corridor for the
movement of resources, capital, and technology. Within this system,
Azerbaijan is no longer just a transit territory but an active
player linking multiple economic regions.
The country’s geographic position—its access to the Caspian
basin, proximity to Central Asia, and established routes to
Europe—makes it a natural bridge between the resource base of the
East and consumer markets in the West. As European states intensify
efforts to make their economies more resilient to external shocks,
the importance of such connecting hubs continues to grow.
Further evidence of deepening ties came with Azerbaijan’s
participation in the 10th anniversary parliamentary summit of the
Three Seas Initiative, held March 24–25, 2026, in Zagreb, Croatia.
Azerbaijan attended as a specially invited guest, reflecting the
growing interest among participating countries in expanding
cooperation with Baku.
During the summit, Azerbaijan’s role as a reliable energy
supplier was once again underscored, particularly amid the ongoing
transformation of Europe’s energy architecture and efforts to
reduce dependence on traditional supply sources. Energy policy is
increasingly linked to long-term sustainability and diversification
of supply routes.
Special attention was given to the development of
forward-looking infrastructure projects, including a “green” energy
corridor connecting the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and onward to
Europe (Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania–Hungary). The project is being
considered within the framework of pan-European energy
infrastructure planning, specifically the Ten-Year Network
Development Plan (TYNDP 2026) of the European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E).
In this context, several EU member states—including Italy—have
also expressed interest in potentially importing electricity over
the long term.
Following a series of energy crises, the European Union has
strengthened its push to diversify suppliers and develop
alternative delivery routes. Within this framework, Azerbaijan is
no longer seen as a temporary solution but as a component of a more
balanced and resilient energy system.
At the same time, the energy agenda is expanding beyond
traditional oil and gas exports. It now includes the development of
comprehensive infrastructure: modernization of pipeline systems,
expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) reception capacity,
coordination of energy markets, and implementation of renewable
energy projects. As a result, Azerbaijan’s role is evolving from
that of a raw materials supplier to a participant in a more complex
and interconnected energy architecture.
Equally important is the development of transport
infrastructure—integrating railways, seaports, and logistics hubs.
This strengthens energy routes by creating a unified network in
which the movement of resources, goods, and investment mutually
reinforce one another. In this context, the Caspian is no longer
viewed solely as a source of raw materials but increasingly as part
of a broader Eurasian exchange system.
Azerbaijan’s status as a special guest also reflects the
evolution of the Three Seas Initiative itself. The platform is
gradually becoming a more flexible mechanism for cooperation, open
to external partners. This allows it to expand geographically
without revising its institutional foundations.
In this sense, Azerbaijan represents a new model of
partnership—one without formal accession but with a high level of
engagement in key projects. This approach enables Baku to
participate in strategic initiatives without additional political
or legal obligations, while allowing the initiative to extend its
reach into critical resource and transport corridors.
Azerbaijan’s involvement in the 3SI orbit contributes to the
formation of an expanded energy and transport corridor linking the
Caspian region with Central Europe and complementing existing
routes. This enhances the strategic importance of the South
Caucasus, transforming it not only into a zone of competing
interests but also into a space where competition coexists with
elements of coordination.
Over the long term, such a configuration could reshape the
balance of power across Eurasia. Countries that prioritize
infrastructure connectivity and diversification are likely to gain
advantages, while models based on limited routes and dependency on
a narrow set of partners risk becoming sources of
vulnerability.
In sum, Azerbaijan’s deepening interaction with the Three Seas
Initiative reflects not just current diplomatic activity but
broader structural changes in Eurasian geoeconomics. By extending
its connectivity to the Caspian region, the initiative is helping
to form a new, large-scale space for cooperation—one in which
Azerbaijan occupies a key position as a link between Asia and
Europe.
As global competition for resources and transport routes
intensifies, the importance of this role will clearly grow.
