Eurasia’s gas balance: How Galkynysh could reshape supply routes

BAKU, Azerbaijan, April 24. The ceremony
inaugurating the fourth-phase development of Turkmenistan’s largest
gas field, Galkynysh, has transcended the scope of a conventional
industrial project. It effectively marks a transition to a new
stage in the evolution of Turkmenistan’s gas industry, one in which
not only production but also the forthcoming transformation of the
country’s export geography assumes central importance.

The fourth-phase project, valued at approximately $5 billion and
undertaken with the participation of the China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), is expected to increase production by roughly
10 billion cubic meters of gas per year. For a field already ranked
among the largest globally, with reserves estimated at 27 trillion
cubic meters, this development further consolidates its position as
a critical resource base for the country.

Currently, total production across Galkynysh and its associated
phases is estimated at 30–35 billion cubic meters per year, with a
significant proportion allocated to exports. With the commencement
of the new phase, total output could rise to 40–45 billion cubic
meters annually. However, production growth alone does not
determine the ultimate trajectory of supplies; the configuration of
export routes and the capacity of existing infrastructure are
equally decisive.

China continues to serve as the primary destination for Turkmen
gas exports, accounting for the overwhelming majority of external
deliveries. Approximately 80–90% of Turkmen gas exports are
transported to China via the Central Asia–China gas pipeline
system, which links Turkmenistan with the PRC through Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan. In this context, China functions as the principal
structural buyer of Turkmen gas, thereby ensuring the stability of
the country’s export model.

Within this framework, the launch of the fourth phase of
Galkynysh, which adds an estimated 10 billion cubic meters of
annual production, directly reinforces the eastern export corridor.
The total capacity of the Central Asian pipeline infrastructure
toward China is currently estimated at approximately 55 billion
cubic meters, with potential expansion to roughly 85 billion cubic
meters through the addition of new lines.

Concurrently, the southern route is acquiring increasing
practical significance. The Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India
(TAPI) gas pipeline project, with a planned capacity of around 33
billion cubic meters per year, identifies the Galkynysh field as
its primary resource base. Preliminary estimates suggest that, if
the TAPI project is successfully implemented, Turkmenistan could
supply 13–14% of India’s total gas imports by 2030.

In 2026, the project has entered a phase of gradual progress on
the Afghan segment: preparations and laying of individual pipeline
sections toward the city of Herat are underway, along with the
formation of the route through the western regions of the country.
Officials of the participating states have declared their intention
to extend the first section to Herat by the end of 2026.

At the same time, the relevance of TAPI is increasingly
reinforced not only as an infrastructure project but also as a
logistical solution in the context of growing instability in
alternative maritime energy transport routes in South Asia and the
Middle East - a reality demonstrated by the US-Israel war against
Iran, which began in February 2026, and the subsequent blockade of
the Strait of Hormuz, a key energy export chokepoint of the Persian
Gulf.

Against this backdrop, attention is returning to the western
export direction - the potential supply of Turkmen gas to Europe
via Azerbaijan. In April 2026, Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid
Meredov, speaking at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, emphasized that
“one of the key priorities of the country’s energy policy is the
supply of natural gas to Europe”. In the same month, the
editor-in-chief of the newspaper Türkmen Dünýäsi, Batyr Muradov,
told Trend that Turkmenistan is considering the possibility
of exporting natural gas to Europe via Azerbaijan.

A few days after these statements, Deputy Chairman of the
Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan and Chairman of the State
Concern “Turkmennebit” Guvanch Agadjanov held a meeting with
Azerbaijan’s Ambassador to Turkmenistan, Gismet Gozalov. The
meeting discussed prospects for cooperation between Baku and
Ashgabat in the energy sector, particularly in oil and gas.

According to the supply mechanism of Turkmen gas along this
route, the natural gas first enters Azerbaijan, then passes through
the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), and finally
reaches Europe via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).

Formally, this infrastructure already exists, but its current
configuration also defines the limits of potential expansion. TAP,
as the final segment supplying Southern Europe, currently operates
at around 10 billion cubic meters per year, with a technical
potential to expand to approximately 20 billion cubic meters with
additional compressor investments.

TANAP, in turn, has a higher capacity - over 30 billion cubic
meters per year - but its utilization also depends on agreed supply
volumes and demand from end markets. Both pipelines operate at more
than half of their capacity, with TAP utilization reaching around
90%. However, with sufficient investment and the implementation of
bypass solutions such as additional interconnectors along TAP,
pipeline capacity could be nearly doubled. This key factor largely
depends on the availability of investments as well as long-term gas
import contracts from European buyers.

Once gas reaches the EU border via Turkey, it enters the wider
European energy system, where planning and coordination are carried
out by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for
Gas (ENTSOG) - an association of European gas transmission
operators coordinating their interaction under EU legislation and
managing gas transport.

Within its Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP), ENTSOG
analyzes various supply and demand scenarios, including potential
additional volumes from the southern direction. However, these are
not treated as guaranteed flows but rather as conditional system
development scenarios.

An additional component of the European gas architecture is the
rapidly expanding LNG infrastructure. Major regasification
capacities are already established in France, Poland, and Greece.
The Dunkerque terminal in France has a capacity of around 13
billion cubic meters per year, Poland’s Świnoujście terminal -
around 7.5 billion cubic meters after expansion, and Greece’s
Revithoussa terminal - more than 5 billion cubic meters of annual
regasification capacity. In total, Europe’s LNG terminal system
provides regasification capacity exceeding 200 billion cubic meters
per year, covering a significant share of regional demand and
forming an alternative to pipeline supplies.

Against this backdrop, Türkiye is becoming increasingly
important, already possessing four LNG terminals, including FSRU
(floating storage and regasification units), and gradually
strengthening its position as a potential energy hub between the
Caspian region, the Middle East, and Europe.

If the expansion of pipeline capacities toward Europe, including
the Southern Gas Corridor, proceeds more slowly than expected or
faces capacity constraints, Türkiye theoretically gains additional
room for maneuver through strengthened LNG infrastructure -
including expansion of existing terminals or the launch of new gas
liquefaction and re-export projects. This adds another potential
layer of diversification for Turkmen gas export routes to Europe -
an institutional dimension where investment decisions and
infrastructure development speed become decisive factors.

As a result, potential additional volumes of Turkmen gas are
embedded in a complex system of access to Eurasian markets. This
requires the alignment of multiple factors, including
infrastructure development and long-term contractual
commitments.

At the regional level, gas transmission systems in Central Asia
- involving Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan - are
historically interconnected but function without a unified
coordination mechanism. With growing production and potential
expansion of export routes, the issue of synchronizing flows in the
region is likely to gain increasing importance.

Naturally, with growing gas export volumes, maintaining the
uninterrupted operation of the gas transportation network along the
entire supply route to end consumers becomes increasingly important
for Ashgabat. This emerging need for infrastructure transformation
may open the way for Turkmenistan to offer its gas transmission
network to neighboring countries as an alternative export route for
energy resources. In particular, Kazakhstan could potentially
redirect its export flows through Turkmenistan to new destinations
if necessary.

Thus, for Turkmenistan, the launch of the fourth phase of
Galkynysh means not only an increase in export potential but also a
strengthening of its role in the broader energy system of Eurasia.
Rising supplies have the potential to reinforce the country’s
macroeconomic base and expand opportunities for financing long-term
state programs, such as the “Social and Economic Development and
Investment Program 2026,” the “Digital Economy Development Program
in Turkmenistan for 2026-2028,” and the “National Socio-Economic
Development Program of Turkmenistan 2022-2052.”

In this context, Turkmenistan is increasingly emerging not just
as a raw materials exporter, but as a potential strategic hub
through which energy flows between different parts of Eurasia could
be routed.