Twenty-five years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks brought al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden to the forefront of global attention, the organization has been significantly weakened by years of counterterrorism operations. Despite the group's fall from public view, its regional offshoots remain active across parts of Africa and Asia.
Although US intelligence agencies had been monitoring al-Qaeda and were aware of bin Laden’s anti-American views before the co-rdinated assault that saw four passenger airliners get hijacked, the September 11 attacks triggered a worldwide campaign by states, aimed at dismantling the organization.
Observers broadly agree that al-Qaeda now operates less frequently under its own name, largely as a result of counterterrorism efforts launched after 2001.
Lars Berger, a professor of terrorism studies at the German Federal University of Administrative Sciences, told the Deutsche Welle outlet that the military campaign in Afghanistan, combined with cooperation between intelligence services and police, significantly weakened the organization.
"From this perspective, the September 11 attacks were a major strategic failure for al-Qaeda," Berger said.
The organization had hoped to radicalize the Arab world and contribute to the overthrow of governments across the region, but those expectations failed to materialize. About a decade after the attacks, bin Laden was killed by US forces in Pakistan in May 2011, prompting al-Qaeda to reorganize.
"The militia sought out areas where it could establish a permanent foothold, for example in parts of Africa or Yemen," Berger said, adding that "countries with weak state structures, overwhelmed security forces and unresolved local conflicts are particularly favorable."
"Today, this is particularly true of Africa," Rüdiger Lohlker, professor emeritus of Islamic studies at the University of Vienna, said.
In the Sahel, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM, has become a powerful al-Qaeda affiliate, according to Lohlker.
An analysis by the Critical Threats Project cited in the article brings Niger as an example of the competition between JNIM and the Islamic State's Sahel Province (ISSP) for territory, fighters and resources. In June 2026, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on the international airport in Niger's capital, Niamey.
Al-Shabaab, which maintains close links to al-Qaeda, remains powerful in Somalia, while al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operates in Yemen. Afghanistan also continues to provide a safe haven for the organization.
Lohlker said, however, that the strength of these groups cannot be attributed solely to jihadist ideology.
Instead, their activities often overlap with what he described as an "economy of violence." He noted that "violence including kidnappings, smuggling and looting has long been an economic factor for terrorism."
He also pointed to what he called "markets for violence," arguing that where violence offers opportunities to make money, jihadist organizations can recruit and retain followers.
"We fundamentally need to move away from a Eurocentric perspective," Lohlker said.
From his perspective, al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups have historically been much more active outside Europe and the US than their presence in Western media has suggested.
According to the outlet's analysis, the strategies of the organization’s regional affiliates have also changed over time. Berger described a "strategic shift" away from direct attacks against the "distant enemy" and toward building local structures.
"We are now seeing an attempt to proceed in an alternative and gradual manner, namely instead of spectacular acts of violence ordered from the highest levels, there are smaller-scale actions that are more grassroots in nature," he said.
In the Sahel, this approach involves building local alliances, expanding influence within communities and establishing territorial control. The Critical Threats Project refers to the process as "localization."
Al-Qaeda has therefore maintained its presence by adapting to local conditions. JNIM exploits ethnic and social tensions in the Sahel, while al-Shabaab takes advantage of conflicts within Somalia’s clan structures. The broader jihadist objective remains an ideological framework, but the fighting itself is increasingly rooted in local conflicts.
Competition between radicals
Al-Qaeda also faces competition for attention and recruits from the so-called "Islamic State," or IS.
"Ultimately, younger jihadists tend to be more drawn to the 'Islamic State,'" terrorism expert Behnam Heidenreuter-Said, head of the research center for Strategic Police Research at the Hamburg Police Academy, told DW.
He said IS had carried out "more spectacular" and media-effective terrorist attacks, while "al-Qaeda has taken a more long-term approach."
Heidenreuter-Said, who published a comprehensive history of al-Qaeda in 2018, said that "IS wanted to make a splash and demonstrate successes as quickly as possible in order to grow explosively."
That rapid expansion was followed by the collapse of IS’s territorial project, he said, while al-Qaeda has continued to operate under different circumstances.
The organization now faces the challenge of replacing its aging fighters. While this remains possible, Heidenreuter-Said said al-Qaeda’s brand is clearly losing influence.
In Europe, militant jihadism has become less attractive, although jihadist ideas have not disappeared. According to Heidenreuter-Said, al-Qaeda has nevertheless lost much of its former ability to mobilize large numbers of young people.
It remains difficult to assess the organization’s current strength and capabilities, he added.
"Everyone agrees that there is currently virtually no information about al-Qaeda and we simply don't know what it is doing right now," he said.
Heidenreuter-Said also noted that since Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, al-Qaeda has had a notably limited presence in the major regional conflicts that followed.
By Nazrin Sadigova
